SELECTIONS BY PAULY FONGEMIE
APPENDIX VI
Salleron on Maritain
When Maritain's book Humanisme
integral first appeared it was
reviewed by Louis Salleron in the Revue
hebdomadaire of 22 August 1936.
This is certainly one of the most perceptive analyses of the
deficiencies of Integral Humanism which has ever appeared and it is
even more remarkable for the fact that it was not written with the
benefit of hindsight but at the time when Maritain was at the height of
his reputation. In contrast with Professor Salleron, many Catholic
intellectuals not only failed to see that Integral Humanism was a
system replete with the serious inconsistencies and self-contradictions
exposed by him, but looked upon it as a blueprint for Catholic
action in the temporal order which could prove to be the salvation of
the Church in the twentieth-century. As was mentioned in Chapter XIII,
Fr. G. B. Montini was so enthusiastic about Humanisme integral that
he translated it into Italian.
In view of its exceptional relevance to the present situation in the
Church, L'Ordre Francais
reprinted Professor Salleron's review in its
issue of December 1973. The introduction it provided to the review is
also included in this appendix and the fact that it was written in 1973
should be noted when reading the comments on the situation in Chile.
Professor Salleron has most kindly given his permission for a
translation of his review to be included as an appendix to Pope John's
Council.
The review was translated by Geoffrey Lawman who also made his own
translation of the extracts from Humanisme
integral cited by Professor
Salleron. For the convenience of readers who possess the official
English translation, or who might obtain it from their libraries, I
have included the page numbers on which these quotations can be found
in the translation made by M. R. Adamson and published in London in
1938 under the title True Humanism.
These page numbers will be found in
brackets after those provided in the notes to the review which, of
course, refer to the original French edition.
Finally, this review does not make easy reading not least because, as
Professor Salleron remarks, the style in which Maritain expresses
himself is not always ''as clear as it might be." The review needs to
be studied rather than read, and to be studied carefully during the
course of several readings. And careful note must be taken of Professor
Salleron's remark that there are "many excellent things to be found in
Humanisme integral." It would be surprising to find any Catholic
who
could read it without deepening his knowledge of theology, the history
of the Church, and authentic Catholic social teaching. The book does,
in fact, contain so much that is excellent that without the insights of
such authorities on Catholic Social teaching as Louis Salleron or
Hamish Fraser the ordinary reader might well have overlooked its
defects. And even where these
deficiencies occur, Maritain's
philosophic brilliance enables him, as Fr. Meinvielle is quoted as
stating in Chapter XIII, "to defend theses which had previously been
advanced by the enemies of religion without appearing directly to
contradict the teaching of the Church."
INTEGRAL HUMANISM
M. Jacques Maritain, Christian Marxist
In a recent article in Carrefour
1, Louis Salleron reminded us, most
opportunely, of some lines Jacques Maritain had written in his Peasant
of the Garonne:
"I only know one example of an authentic 'Christian revolution,' and
that is the one that President Eduardo Frei is trying to carry out in
Chile at the moment, and it is by no means certain that it is going to
succeed. (It is true too what among those of my contemporaries still
alive as I write these lines, I can only see three revolutionaries
worthy of the name: Eduardo Frei in Chile, Saul Alinski in America, and
myself in France, light-weight though I am alongside the others, since
my vocation as a philosopher has completely clouded any talents I may
have had as an agitator.) ..."
At a moment when events in Chile have taken the turn we all know
of, and in view of the undeniable fact that it was the Catholics who
put the Marxist Allende in power, it is interesting to note that
Maritain has recognized Frei as a disciple of his.
"Today," writes Louis Salleron, "the
Christian intending to undertake
Christian political action thinks that the GOSPEL message must be
received as a POLITICAL message, and this inevitably leads him to think
that it is a REVOLUTIONARY message. This is the very opposite of
Catholicism, and indeed of Christianity." Louis Salleron does not
hesitate to hold Jacques Maritain as principally responsible for this
confusion.
In the Revue hebdomadaire of
22 August 1936, Louis Salleron analyzed
Jacques Maritain's book Humanisme
integral, which had just been
published and which created a great stir at the time. It is interesting
to note that this article of Louis Salleron, which we reproduce below
in extenso appeared just a few
weeks after the establishment of the
Popular Front in France.
Nada, Nada, Nada, Nada
(ST. JOHN of the CROSS)
"A Civil Guard, a big man with a bullet in his stomach, ceaselessly
hiccups this word: "Nothing, nothing, nothing ..." (Louis-Delapree,
reporting the Spanish Civil War in Paris-Soir,
28 July 1936)
It is not easy to talk about Monsieur Maritain.
On the purely
contingent political and social problems of man's "here and now" he has
taken up some very advanced positions and yet his central concern has
always been with what is eternal in philosophy and contemplation. This
last has conferred on him an almost sacrosanct status, so that one
hesitates to criticize him in the same way as one would any others of
his contemporaries. Even when he initiates arguments in fields where we
have a right to join in and take issue with him, he inspires us with a
strange awe. However often he repeats that he is not involving the
authority of Aquinas in such arguments, we still cannot help feeling a
sort of unease; we are afraid of infringing some orthodoxy that is far
above our heads and our understanding, or else we feel we may be
attacking him unfairly in the name of such an orthodoxy. It is a most
uncomfortable feeling.
So let it be understood quite clearly here that we leave it to others
better qualified, or more presumptuous than ourselves to find fault
with M. Maritain in the lofty spheres of theology or Thomism. It is on
the rudimentary level of the most primary "degrees of knowing" that we
take our stand in these observations suggested by a reading of his
Humanisme integral. 2
As a Christian before all else, M. Maritain is obsessed by an idee
fixe, the deChristianization of the common people. His most
heartfelt
desire and aspiration is to see the masses restored to the communion of
Christ.
This central concern inspires and determines every step in his thinking
and all the progressive stances he takes up on temporal questions. We
say this openly, so as to make it quite clear that however outspokenly
we may criticize M. Maritain, we shall never be attacking the intention
behind his work, a noble and moving intention which cannot help but
gain the support of believers and the respect of non-believers. But,
whether Christian or not, we remain free to criticize the theses and
hypotheses in the political and social field that he is led to form in
his pursuit of that intention. And, believe me, in this field we shall
certainly not be the only ones to disagree with him.
The very title Maritain gives to his
book reveals the full extent of
his hope ... and, in our eyes, the magnitude of his error or of his
temptation.
Integral Humanism for him is nothing other than Christian humanism, a
humanism which recognizes "That God is the centre for man," which
presupposes "the Christian concept of man sinning and redeemed, and the
Christian concept of grace and freedom." 3 In short,
Integral Humanism
is God-centred, whereas traditional humanism was man-centred. "The
fundamental defect of anthropocentric humanism " writes M. Maritain,
"was that it was man-centred, not that it was a humanism." 4
But it is surely obvious to everyone
that humanism is by definition man-centred! The adjective is quite superfluous, a pure
tautology, only possible through the linguistic trick of using a Greek
root that repeats the meaning of the noun of Latin origin. The words
themselves prove M. Maritain wrong, just as he proves history wrong.
For it is indeed true that humanism - the thing and the word - arose as
recently as the sixteenth century as a counter blast to the prevailing
theocentrism, and ever since then has reappeared with each of the
revolutions that have set man up against God by making man himself a
god. When so many intellectuals declare that they support
Communism in the name of humanism, the paradox is only an apparent one.
Although absurd from all other points of view, their position is a
valid one from the religious point of view. Communism gives them back a
"soul"; it restores their "fertility," as Malraux says.
M. Maritain is aware of this, and he does not contradict it. (All his
chapter entitled "The Tragedy of Humanism" is first rate.) But the
conclusion he draws from this is that a total reversal of the terms is
not merely possible but essential. He wants to replace pure atheism by
a pure Christianity, to offer God to the man without God. Humanism is
not to be abolished but transfigured, and this concept may well be
called Integral Humanism.
"We believe," he writes, "that what we call Integral Humanism is
capable of saving and fostering, within a fundamentally new synthesis,
all the truths affirmed or glimpsed by socialist humanism, by uniting
them in an organic and vital way to many other truths." 5
In pure logic this is true. But it would be just as true to say
"integral egoism," "integral hedonisms" "integral communism." Since
evil exists only as privation of being, any "integralized" evil becomes
a good, becomes indeed the good. Any
error becomes truth if one projects whatever truth it contains onto the
absolute plane.
This applies too when one considers morality. The sinner seeks
some immediate and temporary good. One could say to a sinner who
commits the seven deadly sins seventy times a day: "Go and ask God, and
you will obtain straight away what you are so vainly pursuing." But
that is no reason for calling sanctity "integral sin."
Of course, Maritain could reply that "sin" signifies evil as such, and
that "integral sin" is nothing but evil at its maximum, whereas
"integral humanism" signifies the maximalization of whatever good is
contained in the mixture of good and evil we call humanism. I do not
disagree. All I am trying to do is to
show how dangerous his use of language is; it is a verbal trick that
does not help to resolve any of our problems, since it leads just as
validly in two opposite directions. Unfortunately the danger implicit in M.
Maritain's handling of words affects his philosophical (or apostolic)
arguments too. He is tossing the coin for heads or tails, and there is
no certainty that heads ... the side with the cross on it ... will come
face upward.
Does M. Maritain have a doctrine of freedom? He says he does, but the
underlying reason for his present social and political views is an
historical determinism. This
determinism does not attempt to conceal itself, and crops up on page
after page of his argumentation.
M. Maritain divides the past into "historic ages," "ages of
civilization." He is entitled to do this; it is moreover a convenient
way of explaining history. But his determinism becomes most clearly
marked when he is discussing the present and future. M. Maritain
claims, in fact, to be able to distinguish all those elements of the
present that are of necessity for the future. In other words, he claims
to know what the essential nature (he calls this the "historic
climate") of the society of the future will be.
Setting as his objective the working-out of "the concrete historical
ideal" of a new Christendom, he writes:
"What do we mean by 'concrete historical ideal'? It is an image
projected into the future, signifying the particular, specific type of
civilization towards which a certain historical period is tending.
"When Thomas More, Fenelon, Saint-Simon or Fourier drew up their
Utopias, what they were building was purely an 'ens rationis,' a mental construct
deriving its being entirely from their own reason, isolated from
anything having real existence at a particular period and date, having
no relationship to any particular historical climate; a construct
expressing an absolute maximum of social and political perfection and
whose structure it is possible to describe in every little imaginary
detail, since it is a fictitious model, offered to our minds as a
substitute for reality.
"By contrast, what we call a concrete historical ideal is not a pure
creation of thought, but an ideal essence, one that is capable of
attainment (with greater or less difficulty, more or less perfection,
but that is another question; concerning only the process of
realization, and not the finished product), an essence that is capable
of existence, calling into being an existence appropriate to a given
historical climate, and then responding to a relative maximum
(relative, that is, to that historical climate) of social and political
perfection, and displaying-precisely because it implies an order
capable of concrete existence - only those lines of force and
adumbrations of a future reality whose final shape must be determined
later." 6
The style of the passage is not as
clear as it might be, but the thought is crystal-clear, to the point
where it immediately suggests a name to our mind, that of Marx.
It is not M. Maritain's habit to avoid
dangerous encounters. And so he speaks of Marx. He blames him
for having reduced man's freedom "to the mere spontaneity of a vital
force", 7 and for "not having brought out clearly the
notion of virtuality (potentiality)." 8 He also
blames those who criticize Marxist Hegelianism and historical
materialism and yet often accept the Marxist "way of posing the
question." 9 The
fact remains, that if we put his speculative posture on one side, he
looks to us terribly Marxist himself, in a practical sense. Not Marxist
in his conclusions, of course, but in his dialectic. What is more, he observes, very rightly,
that "Marxism is only able to reject the concept of an ideal at the
price of a contradiction (and, in fact, its propaganda evades
neither the concept nor the term 'Communist ideal'). It expressly
claims to be a philosophy of action, an action destined to transform
the world, and how can man act on the world unless he sets himself a
goal determined not solely by economic and social progress but also by
his own choice and his own loves? A goal which includes not only the
movement of objective reality, but also man's own creative freedom
controlling and directing that movement? Such is precisely what I mean
by concrete historical ideal." 10
Between Marxism and the
philosophico-social position of M. Maritain there are two theoretical
differences; a doctrinal difference - M. Maritain believes in freedom,
and Marx denies it: and a difference of purpose - M. Maritain pursues
Integral Humanism while the Marxists are content with humanism pure and
simple. But there is one very important similarity: M. Maritain is in
agreement with the Marxists on how to interpret contemporary history
and what direction its transformation will take. He is so much in
agreement with them that his whole activity is nothing but a race, not
a race to get there first (for the victory of Communism is presumed to
be inevitable), but a race to arrive in time to effect an immediate
transformation of defeat and error into triumph and truth in that new
Christendom that he is working to bring about. He is in a sense
in a hurry to arrive at that definitive simplification of the data of
the problem" ... The place is ready (he writes) for a new absolutism,
and this time a materialist one (whether open or disguised), more
hostile than ever to Christianity ... Thus the apparently most logical
of historical positions reappears, and the old battles of the Christian
faith against the despotism of the powers of the flesh." 11
Readers might perhaps like us to give some evidence of this agreement
we note between M. Maritain and the Marxists on the interpretation of
contemporary history. We shall do so, but briefly: treated in full the
subject would require many pages.
It is quite clear that when M. Maritain says that politics must
"estimate the amount of energy available for historical realization and
the coefficient of futurity present in the good and evil aspects" of
passing events; an agreement about the present implying a partial
agreement about the future. It cannot be disputed that an agreement on
the present is already in force.
M. Maritain considers, indeed, that the "proletariat" has made an
historical advance by gaining a certain awareness of itself, which is
both "an awareness of its offended and humiliated human dignity and an
awareness of its historic mission." 12
But this awareness implies, in his eyes, a consequence: "If the
proletariat asks to be treated as an adult, it follows that it is not
to be aided, bettered or saved by another social class. It is to the
working class itself, and to its historic upward climb, that the chief
part in the next phase of evolution falls." 13 And
he adds "... since man is at the same time flesh and spirit, since any
great enterprise in temporal history has its material, biological and
sociological bases into which even man's animality and the whole wealth
of his sub-rational being are incorporated and exalted, it is normal
that in the transformation of a regime such as capitalism, it should be
the working class that provides this sociological basis, and in this
sense one can speak of its historic mission, and one can consider that
the destiny of mankind depends largely today on what action it takes." 14
All this is clear enough, but we are still in the field of
generalizations. What follows, is, by contrast, quite concrete. Trying
to foresee what form future political organizations "temporally and
politically determined and specifically Christian in inspiration" could
take, M. Maritain examines the position they would find themselves in
at the present moment.
We feel it advisable to quote the passage in full. "Their concrete
situation (and hence their practical attitude) towards the Communist
forces and those forces which, for lack of a more suitable generic
name, we shall call 'fascist' (Italian fascism representing the first
form under which certain basically common but very variously specified
energies have manifested themselves in history) will in our view be
determined primarily by the following dominant ideas or factual
conditions: on the one hand the various sorts of fascism are all, by
virtue of their original bent and their glorification of the State, in
opposition to the historical ideal in which such political
organizations should see their specificatory purpose, and opposed to
the existential base itself, and to that very primordial necessity
itself which they (the organizations) would recognize, - by
'existential base' I mean the movement that bears history towards a
substantial mutation in which the 'Fourth Estate, 15
will (whether under a good or a bad banner still depends a good deal on
man's will) come into possession of property, real freedom and a real
share in the direction of politics and the economy; and by 'primordial
necessity' I understand the historic necessity to 'reintegrate the
masses' into a civilization Christian in its spirit. On the other hand,
Communism does indeed recognize the existential base we have spoken of,
but falsifies the notion because of its erroneous philosophy of man and
society, and consequently distorts the direction to be given to its
evolution. Where our new (Christian) political organisms would proclaim
the overriding need to reintegrate the masses into a civilization
Christian in spirit, Communism declares the necessity of integrating
them into a civilization atheist in spirit; where our organisms would
admit the need for a large measure of economic collectivization so as
to allow the individual to lead a supra-collective life, Communism
intends a total collectivizing of the economy in such a way that the
whole life of the human being is thus collectivized.
"In this way, the goal and very raison
d'etre of the whole movement are perverted in the case of
Communism, the historic basis (and the goal) are rejected in the case
of fascism." 16
This passage is all-important, for it
clearly shows that although M. Maritain rejects both the various
fascisms and Communism, he at least grants a certificate of orthodoxy
to Communism as far as the 'historical base' is concerned. That is all
we wanted to prove.
Other texts are no less characteristic.
"... Communism (writes M. Maritain) appears as an erroneous system
which both stimulates and distorts an historical process, positively
given 17 in existence: the process of historical
'birth and decay' by virtue of which a new civilization ... will be
established outside the shattered framework of bourgeois civilization.
By contrast, the different types of 'fascism' arose right from the
beginning as defensive reflexes, both against this existential process
and against. Communism itself ..." 18
I have given enough quotations to make my point. Once one has read
them, one will not be surprised that M. Maritain considers that
"fascist and racist totalitarian regimes cannot grasp the movement of
history in its most basic aspect" 19 and that these
regimes appear to him as "historical fatalities that in reality make
Communism or other historical disasters of equal magnitude all the more
likely, since, although in their reaction against Communism they score
immediate short-term successes that strike the imagination, they are
incapable of rising above Communism and discovering the truly human
form that the movement of history calls for. This discovery will only
be made by an effort of the spirit and of human freedom overcoming the
determinism of the material forces of progress." 20
Such postulates seem dangerous to us,
for they constitute in fact a net contribution to the cause of
Communism.
Please do not accuse us of unfairly selective quotation. We know - and
we have said so - that M. Maritain is too learned, too prudent and too
sincere ever to fail to draw attention to doctrinal errors. He does not
preach heresy, he does not preach Marxism, nor does he preach
revolution. His reservation is always there, as a footnote or in a
parenthetical clause. But we have a duty to look beyond these details.
He has an accent, a slant, and it is his slant, his emphasis that we
are focussing on and underlining here. The whole of M. Maritain's
dialectic is purely Marxist and all his 'socio-temporal' likes and
preferences are directed towards Communism because it is only the
latter that possesses an historical meaning and an historical mission.
M. Maritain reprobates Communism but
he opens the way to it and fosters its realization by the fact that he
considers it to be the necessary end-product of the errors of the past,
and to be the medium moreover for the transmission of a host of social
truths which Christianity has the responsibility of bringing to full
fruition. We defy any honest reader to challenge our interpretation.
Likewise, we do not think M. Maritain will accuse us of
misinterpreting or distorting his thinking. In fact we think that, if
an opportunity presented itself, he would confirm the attitude he has
taken up as regards the present age, and would even contribute new
justifications for his views. It seems likely that there is only one
subject on which he would agree to a debate, and that would be the
"historical basis" of his position. "Show me first of all that it is
wrong," he would say.
But we should not agree to a debate on
such a subject; its starting-point seems to us full of error. For
although it is true that our acts follow us and that the present
determines the futures it is impossible for us to know what these
historical "lines of force" to which M. Maritain attaches such
importance really are. And even if we did know them in the form in
which they appear in our days, we could not imagine under what new form
they would appear tomorrow; not only does the human will exist
with its amazing capacity for creating history, but even if we remain
on the plane of that social alchemy and its determinism that exercises
such a strong effect on M. Maritain's mind, there are surprises ... in fact we find
nothing but surprises. Our
imagination is so bound up in the superficial appearances of the moment
that it soon grows exhausted by the effort of trying to invent the
future. It is true that once the future has in its turn become the
past, we manage to relate it to the earlier past with faultless logic.
But our imagination had been incapable of conceiving it. It then had
just been one of a great number of possibilities and, nine times out of
ten, just the very one we had not foreseen.
Does this mean that man is powerless
as regards the future? Certainly not. But the future does not belong to
him, and the only hold he has on it is through his will and through his
knowledge of laws and causes. Let us take a good look at what
separates us here from M. Maritain (once again we are speaking of his
manifest tendencies, not of his doctrine). We say that the intelligence
can know the immutable, that is to say the necessary relationships that
exist between man's nature and the nature of things at each moment in
history. This knowledge implies positive solutions in order that order,
justice and peace may reign, all those elements, in short, of the
common good of society, in which the Christian is as interested as the
non-believer. Taking this knowledge as its starting-point, the will of
man then acts to impose his solutions. This seems to us a good
translation of the admirable phrase of Canovas de Castillo when he said
that one must make possible whatever is necessary. One must first of
all make it possible, and then do it.
M. Maritain, on the other hand, starts
(from a practical viewpoint) from a knowledge of progress, and goes on to infer its
future development; and in order to modify this future he appeals less
to our will than to our freedom, which he conceives as the spiritual
directing element of a mysterious collective biology. For Maritain, the
necessary is not so much what is (substantially and in a permanent
manner) as what is becoming; and if he wanted to plagiarize
Canovas de Castillo, he would willingly say, I think, that one must
Christianize what is necessary. Hence the formulas one finds on every
page of Humanisme integral,
according to which one must "act upon history" 21
(why indeed not?), one must "devote all one's energy to constantly
increasing the sum of goodness and justice in the bank account of
history ," and "not act as if, in order to separate the cockle from the
wheat, we had to close the bank account and thus halt the very movement
itself of that historical existence in which we are living," etc. 22
At bottom, all M. Maritain's error
arises from the fact that his immense generosity is badly ordered. We
mean by this that its natural order or plane is that of thought, and
that he wrongly transposes it onto the order or plane of action. By so
doing he even vitiates his thought. He was made to know and explain,
and nowadays he thinks less clearly and his explanations are all awry,
thanks to his desire to direct a movement.
Since he hasn't the slightest vocation
for leading men or controlling events, he ends by bowing down and
yielding to the allegedly irreversible trends of history, his hope and
intention being to steer these by sheer force of spirit. Here he is
doubly mistaken, since these inevitable trends do not exist, and also
because spirit alone is powerless. If some new Joan of Arc
should (purely as an hypothesis) arise and declare that "when it comes
to exchanging hard knocks, we shall see which side God is on," no doubt
M. Maritain would send her back to her parents after explaining to her
that such bloodthirsty delight in fighting was no longer appropriate to
the "historical climate" into which we are now entering. And yet our
new Joan of Arc (once again as a pure hypothesis) could answer him just
as the first Joan did to the doctors of Poitiers: "Sire, God has a book
in which no clerk has ever read, however perfect he may be in clerkly
learning." 23
We need go no further. Our objection to M. Maritain's ideas is
sufficiently clear without our saying any more.
Our criticism does not, in any case, prevent us from appreciating the
many excellent things to be found in Humanisme integral; even less does
it prevent us from paying homage to M. Maritain's many fine books of
pure philosophy, which we have always read with great pleasure.
But M. Maritain must not try to turn
himself into a social or political philosopher; he is quite unfitted
for such a role, and is indeed positively dangerous.
Indignation, say the diplomats, is not a constructive state of mind in
which to approach political affairs. Neither is the spirit of 'todo y
nada.' 24
LOUIS SALLERON
1. 18 October
1973, Chile
and Christian politics.
2. Published by Editions Montaigne, one volume.
3. Humanisme integral, p. 35. ( 19)
4. Ibid. p. 35. ( 19)
5. Humanisme integral, p. 98. (81)
6. Humanisme integral, p. 140 (121-2)
7. Humanism integral, p.141 (123)
8. Ibid., p. 142. (124)
9. Ibid., p. 155. (136)
10. Ibid., pp. 143-144. (125)
11. Humanism integral, pp. 172-173. - Cf. also p. 258. (153-154)
12. Ibid., p. 246. (225)
13. Ibid., p. 250. (229)
14. Humanism integral, pp. 251-252 (230)
15. M. Maritain means
here the proletariat, not the Press, often called the "Fourth Estate"
in English. (Translator's note).
16. Humanism integral, pp. 290-291. (268-269).
17. In the
philosophical sense (translator's note).
18. Ibid., p. 295. (272-273).
19. Ibid., p. 297. (275). In no sense should it be
thought that Professor Salleron is expressing any sympathy with fascist
or racist regimes. He is using this particular quotation to emphasize
the fact that Maritain sees the advent of some form of Communism as
inevitable, i.e. because in this instance Maritain is criticizing these
regimes for failing to accept that this is so ("the movement of history
in its most basic aspect"). (Note by Michael Davies.)
20. Ibid, p. 300. It is surely worthwhile to
emphasize the extent to which the vocabulary and, in a sense, the very
curve or graph of all the arguments we have just quoted from M.
Maritain, are impregnated with Marxism. (277)
21. Humanism integral, p. 15. (xvi)
22. Ibid., p. 236. - The words history, historic
movement, historic forces, progress, energies, lines offorce, etc.,
recur constantly in M. Maritain's writing. (215-216)
23. One feels
entitled to ask what "line of force" in the destiny of France could be
apparent to a Thomist philosopher in the year of grace 1429.
24. i.e. 'all and
nothing'.
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